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The immediate challenge facing Africa’s new single market may be too little
trade, but there is a looming danger of growing interstate inequality and
uneven development.
Trading commenced under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
agreement in January. However the journey to increased intra-African trade will be a
long one, and some key protocols are still being negotiated. As Africa pursues trade-
driven industrialisation, the process must be as inclusive as possible.
One of the major criticisms levied against the deal is that gains will accrue
disproportionately across Africa. This could happen between countries, within
countries, between  rms and among people. Pre-existing inequalities mean that
more advanced countries, cities, manufacturing  rms and the African economic elite
could bene t the most from the trade increase.
There are several reasons for this. The AfCFTA arguably has the highest income
disparities between its member countries than other continental free trade
agreements. Together, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt – three out of 54 countries –
account for about 50% of Africa’s GDP. So the African single market brings together
unequal economies with varying production capacities.
South Africa, as the continent’s most industrialised economy, is at an advantage.
Trade Map reports that in 2020 Africa imported US$20 billion worth of goods from
South Africa. It’s the sixth-largest supplier of African imports, after China, India,
France, the United States and Germany.
South Africa also dominates trade within the Southern African Customs Union. Trade
bene ts may be disproportionately attained by its economy, thus enriching its
producers and government more than other countries in the region.
Another issue is the documented link between import exposure and a rise in
protectionism and xenophobia. An eventual  ooding of African markets with South
African goods could harm local industries and affect employment. This could grow
resentment against the AfCFTA and negative sentiments about its promised gains.
Within countries, cities and urban areas are often better integrated into trade value
chains, and research shows that supra-national trade, if poorly managed, can
increase uneven development. This could widen income gaps between cities and
rural areas – especially when trade leads to a move away from commodity exports,
leaving commodity-producing rural areas behind.
A similar situation can be found on the  rm level. Although there has been some talk
and efforts to make it easier for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to trade
under the agreement, economies of scale mean that large manufacturing companies
have the advantage because they are more competitive.
The high cost of transporting goods within Africa means that higher trade volumes
will reduce the unit cost of transportation. Large  rms like the Dangote Group of
Companies could more affordably expand production and export their goods across
the continent. SMEs may also  nd it harder to meet the AfCFTA’s rules of origin
requirements.
Imbalances on the  rm level are linked to income disparities between rich and poor
in some African countries. Pro ts from increased intra-Africa trade can
disproportionately accrue to African industrial elites, expanding the wealth gap.
Africa is already home to some of the world’s most unequal societies. Increased
continental trade will increase the demand for manufactured goods. Economic elites
with higher ownership of the means of production are better placed to reap the
pro ts from trade.
In Nigeria, this applies to its industrial elites. A 2016 Oxfam report states that the
income Nigeria’s richest man could earn annually was su cient to lift two million
people out of poverty. In South Africa, high racialised income inequality means that a
small portion of its population with more production capital and assets may
disproportionately bene t from trade.
In most African countries, economic power is closely linked to political power.
Economic elites can co-opt production policies in their favour and perpetuate their
dominance. The tendency to retain reduced production costs as pro ts, threatens
the potential for more affordable goods for consumers.
If the trade deal fails to bring tangible bene ts to the average African, populist
elements may seek to mobilise people against the agreement. Its overarching
objective is to bring prosperity to all Africans. An AfCFTA-driven increase in
inequality could lead to more civil unrest in Africa, which is already at high levels.
The agreement has attempted to put some measures – such as delaying full trade
liberalisation – in place to protect Africa’s less developed economies, but these may
be insu cient. Restrictions on labour mobility across Africa are a stumbling block
for income redistribution, as workers marginalised by import exposure in poorer
countries cannot simply move to richer ones.
A more pragmatic approach is to map out the short-, medium- and long-term
‘winners’ of the agreement as it’s currently designed and to  nd ways to mitigate the
losses of the others. Several AfCFTA signatories have either produced national and
regional implementation strategies or are now doing so.
The AfCFTA Secretariat should evaluate these strategies and identify opportunities
for creating complementary regional value chains that include smaller economies.
Collaboration with the African Development Bank to identify and  nance critical
infrastructure will help improve the production competitiveness of less advantaged
economies and their attractiveness for investment.
National AfCFTA implementation strategies must also integrate rural economies into
national trade economies and not focus only on cities. Large  rms should be
encouraged to integrate SMEs into their supply chains to increase the distributary
effects of trade, with women-owned SMEs given particular attention. Taxation
structures in some countries could be reformed to redistribute wealth and
capabilities, but without suffocating the productivity of industrial elites.
National governments should lower  nancing barriers to entering key manufacturing
sub-sectors to increase the economic actors in these spaces. Tracking indicators of
prosperity like job creation in tradable sectors and poverty reduction can provide
critical data for measuring and improving trade returns.
While there’s a real threat of too little trade under the agreement, tackling these
issues will ensure sustainable progress. The AfCFTA could be a game-changer for
African economies. It should be viewed as an opportunity to solve the continent’s
production puzzle alongside its distribution dilemma.
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